Sunday, September 7, 2014
Courts are mindful of commercial "reality" when deciding competing summary judgment motions in Law 75 cases
In Casco Sales v. John Deere, 2014 WL 4233241 (D.P.R. Aug. 26, 2014)(Gelpi, J.), the dealer sued the principal for constructive termination, impairment, and unjustified termination of contract under Law 75 and for fraudulent inducement or "dolo" to enter into a settlement agreement. Plaintiff Casco Sales had been the exclusive dealer in Puerto Rico of the John Deere construction equipment line for decades.
Supported by an expert report, Casco claimed damages of $1.6 million for five years of net profits and loss of goodwill if the termination occurred in March, 2013. Had the base period of the termination been in 2009, damages computed under Law 75 were $4.6 million. A steep decline in the construction industry and the demand for construction equipment over that recessionary five year period explain the discrepancy in the financial results and the significantly lower measure of damages.
Casco Sales alleged that John Deere had fraudulently induced it to settle a prior Law 75 federal case in 2009 based on representations in the settlement agreement that it would cooperate to grow sales and it breached those representations. Thus, recovery for fraud (dolo) includes all damages whether or not foreseeable, including the actual damages Casco Sales would have recovered under Law 75 had the case not settled with 2009 as the base period. It is a fraud claim under the Civil Code that is related to the success of a showing of impairment under Law 75.
What triggered the second lawsuit was that in March, 2013, John Deere notified the unilateral termination of the distributor agreement. John Deere alleged that failure to pay bills on time, failure to comply with new model qualification requirements, among other alleged breaches of contractual provisions, were just cause for termination.
The dealer's termination had a tormented history of its own. As noted, in 2009, Casco Sales sued John Deere in federal court for impairment of contract under Law 75 alleging that John Deere had unilaterally altered credit or sales terms and had been arbitrary in their business dealings. In 2009, the case settled and the parties resumed their business relationship. Three years later, and coincidentally after the three-year caducity period in Law 75 expired, in December 2012, John Deere refused to honor a substantial purchase order of $264,000 placed by Casco Sales for the sale of an excavator because it claimed that the dealer was not qualified to serve that machine. Yet, two months later, John Deere would have sold through Casco Sales a similar machine to one of its national accounts in Puerto Rico, although Casco Sales had not completed the same training requirements. Casco alleged that this refusal to deal affected its cash flow and the ability to pay bills in full and was an unjustified impairment and constructive termination of contract.
The Court denied the parties' competing motions for summary judgment finding genuine and material disputes of fact and citing the First Circuit's Welch case for the proposition that just cause generally involves issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Because the Court understood that the fraud claim under the Civil Code was tied to the success of the Law 75 impairment claim it also survived summary judgment.
The decision is notable for a few other points.
First, when it is alleged that the principal refuses to honor a purchase order without just cause, Law 75 activates the rebuttable presumption of lack of just cause. Thus, the principal has the burden of proof of justifying its decision to refuse to deal and the actual subsequent termination.
Second, the Court declined to accept Casco Sales' invitation to navigate unchartered waters and hold that Law 75 recognizes a right of action for constructive termination. In dicta, the Court opined that such a claim would require a court to legislate for it does not appear to be codified in the statute. The Court construed Casco Sales' constructive termination claim as "emphasizing" the extent or degree of the impairment.
Third, and perhaps most important when it comes to surviving an MSJ for alleged lack of timely payment, the Court held "...to ignore the possibility that John Deere’s refusal to honor the purchase order (in December 2012) may have impacted Casco’s ability to timely pay its debt (before the termination in March 2013) would ignore reality. This is yet another issue that turns on fact."
Casco Sales alleged that the dealer's contract in this case did not define payments on time as an essential obligation. The Court cited First Circuit precedent under Law 75 excusing the timeliness of payments where there has been some conduct attributable to the principal that has contributed to payment delays. The Court denied the parties' "substantial" and competing MSJ's.
This author represents Casco Sales in that case.