Saturday, April 4, 2020
Alert to clients and friends!
During the pandemic, CAB remains open for business and is prepared to serve our clients from our homes. Before the Government of Puerto Rico announced its extension of the work at home and closure order until April 12, we announced ours to be safe. Our full-staff of attorneys and support employees stand ready and fully-equipped to manage the crisis and continue to serve our clients working remotely to provide the best service possible. Our attorneys have access to e-mail and are available to talk by cel. phone or video-conference. We are staying safe and hope you are too.
In a case of first impression: bankruptcy court rules that Law 75 arbitration award of damages is not part of a lender’s security interest
PRHS has won important victories in litigation and arbitration against Johnson & Johnson International and now against Banco Santander, a lender.
In Santander de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico Hospital Supply, Inc., ADV. PROC. No. 19-00448 (ESL), _____ B.R.____(D.P.R. April 3, 2020), the bankruptcy court for the District of Puerto Rico (Lamoutte, J.) in a thorough 25-page Opinion & Order granted the debtor’s PRHS’s motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding filed by the lender-creditor Banco Santander. Banco Santander has a security interest over the debtor’s receivables and other collateral, as specified in the instrument, to guarantee a commercial loan of $32 million.
Struck by both its principal supplier of medical products and devices Johnson & Johnson International's termination of the distribution agreements and Banco Santander's foreclosure of its security interest, PRHS filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Vital for the debtor’s plan of reorganization is the estate’s claim over the million-dollar plus damages arbitration award against J&JI for its termination without just cause of a non-exclusive agreement (later confirmed by the federal district court and pending on appeal) and the ensuing claim of over $10 million for termination of the exclusive agreements pending in a parallel stayed federal case.
In the bankruptcy, the lender Santander claims that the proceeds of the arbitration award and the federal case belong to it as part of its collateral guaranteed by the security interest. In In re American Cartage, Inc., 656 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir. 2011), the First Circuit- itself addressing an issue of first impression under Massachusetts U.C.C. law- held that the lender’s security interest in that case did not extend over commercial tort claims. The question presented in the Santander adversary proceeding raised the same novel issues under Puerto Rico law.
First, the bankruptcy court ruled that the plain language of Law 75 creates a right of action for the tortious act of terminating a dealer’s contract. This meant that the proceeds of the arbitration award did not originate from the dealer’s performance of a contract or contract rights guaranteed by the collateral, but instead arose from a violation of tort law. Second, the Law 75 tort claim was a commercial tort claim instituted by a corporation within the meaning of Puerto Rico’s Uniform Commercial Code. As such, commercial tort claims do not fall within the meaning of accounts or intangibles in the U.C.C., and are thus, excluded from the collateral. Third, and dispositive as in In Re American Cartage, which the court found persuasive, Santander’s security interest did not specify commercial tort claims as part of its collateral. Fourth, the after-acquired damages award arose after the execution of Santander’s security agreement and the collateral instruments did not specify it, as held in In Re American Cartage.
CAB represents PRHS in the arbitration, in the federal confirmation proceeding and J&JI’s First Circuit appeal, and in the stayed federal litigation.
Wednesday, February 19, 2020
I’m digressing from the subject-matter of my Law 75 blog, for once in the past 11 years, to address an important and growing concern to me, and certainly to many other members of the bar. System-wide, many civil cases are languishing in our federal courts. We are now at a turning point in history where civil cases in our Puerto Rico Courts of First Instance are progressing faster than in federal court. We dwell about this topic informally, at least between lawyers, but rarely we put pencil to paper on it.
Now more than ever, an independent federal judiciary remains the last check and balance on the exercise of power by other branches of government and is the forum of choice to vindicate federal constitutional rights. This power assumes that judges will decide the cases that are brought before them and will do so reasonably promptly.
Time and again, our federal court in Puerto Rico shines in public opinion among the most trusted of institutions. The rule of law, judicial independence, and the fair and expeditious administration of justice should figure prominently in a favorable public opinion. But if judges at all levels take months or even years to decide motions and appeals, not only does this diminish the effectiveness of the judiciary as a check and balance on the abuse of power, but the public’s confidence in the rule of law is likely to be shattered.
The impact on the litigants themselves of an important motion or an appeal that remains undecided for months or years or a trial that is never heard should not be underestimated. Clients lose interest or money to continue litigating. Cases settle that should not be settled or are settled prematurely or not settled when they should be. Cases are voluntarily dismissed or abandoned. Priorities and expectations of clients change. Witnesses leave the company, their memories fade, or worse, they die. Companies are sold, closed, or go bankrupt. Individual parties may pass away without their cases ever heard. As the clock turns, the parties or their decision-makers, even lawyers, change, retire, or disappear from the action. Litigants demand answers from their attorneys and few satisfactory answers emerge to them from questions like: “why if you had to file a brief in 30 days or less and the court denied an extension of time has the court taken months or even a full presidential election cycle to decide your motion?” “When is the court going to decide?” You say, “the court is busy with many other older cases or others that have more priority or the criminal cases are taking too much time, but your motion will be listed in “Cheo”* after 6 months from the last filing, and all we can do is wait.” There is, of course, no federal or local rule of civil or appellate procedure obligating judges to decide motions within a date certain. But still, parties need and deserve prompt rulings.
Rights are not vindicated during a march that becomes eternal to judicial finality. The often-repeated motto rings true: “justice delayed is justice denied.” In 1986, then U.S. District Court Judge Hon. José A Fusté, who himself made his career in private practice, impressed upon me as his first law clerk about the importance of working diligently and overtime as he implemented his rocket docket to bring down a case load of over 550 cases with multi-party criminal prosecutions. Many judges then and now share the same strong work ethic day in and out.
As far as moving the wheels of justice, I have learned that a judicial opinion does not have to be in every case lengthy or perfect according to the Oxford Dictionary or the Blue Book or written for publication every time, but it should be the best effort to apply the law to the facts, expeditiously. When we, as litigants, start thinking about mandamus relief or filing informative motions that try to be creative with every topic imaginable to update the record just to reappear as a blip in the court’s radar screen, you share your client’s frustration that the case has been sitting for far too long.
A swift remedy in any form, be it in a lengthy published decision, a line order, or a bench ruling, serves well both the expectations of the parties and the administration of justice. This is essential for preserving the rule of law.*
* "Cheo" has been colloquially-speaking known over the past 30 years as a list or report that federal district judges in Puerto Rico are required to submit to the First Circuit Court of Appeals under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 describing all the motions that have been submitted for 180 days or more without a ruling or cases over 3 years old that have not been resolved to judgment. There is no private right of action for a violation of the CJRA. Those CJRA lists should be available to the public in the Federal Judicial Center's web-site. "Cheo" comes from the saying in Spanish: "estás en las páginas de Cheo" which roughly means "you are on a watch list."
* This piece will be republished in the Newsletter of the Puerto Rico Chapter of the FBA.
Sunday, February 16, 2020
I’ve been writing for some time that, what parties stipulate in a contract matters, particularly forum and choice of law provisions in the event of disputes or litigation. In fact, this can be outcome determinative in many cases.
For stateside suppliers, the standard protocol should be an integrated written agreement with stateside choice of law provisions to the exclusion of Puerto Rico law and arbitration with both a locale and arbitrator selection in a state or dispute resolution in a state or federal court. What arbitration does is that it adds finality to the award. If the arbitrator gets it right or wrong, the parties have to live with that result. But the reward that a stateside arbitrator may enforce the contract and apply U.S. state law excluding Law 75, a decision that would generally be final under the FAA, is sufficiently attractive for suppliers to insist on those types of provisions in their dealer agreements. As the First Circuit ruled recently in a case, challenging an award under the FAA is figuratively “like climbing Mount Everest.” Dealers can and should be expected to resist this during contractual negotiations.
For Puerto Rico dealers, the standard protocol should be no written contract at all (this approach carries some uncertainty and risks) or if there’s a written contract requirement, apply Puerto Rico law to the exclusion of other laws and dispute resolution in Puerto Rico courts. For Puerto Rico dealers, arbitration is not necessarily an option that should be off the table as long as the arbitrator is selected from a list of Puerto Rico arbitrators, is required to apply Puerto Rico substantive law to the agreement or its termination, and the locale of the arbitration is in Puerto Rico.
There is no uniformity in U.S. state law on the question whether a choice of law provision in a dealer agreement selecting state law without regards to conflict of law rules will apply or exclude Puerto Rico law as a matter of public policy. Some states will apply Puerto Rico law and override state law because that state’s choice of law rules, patterned after the Restatement on Conflict of Laws, require applying the law of the state or territory that is vested with public policy. On the other hand, other states will honor the selected choice of law clause regardless of the public policy of another state, though there are exceptions for fraud or tort claims (on plain statutory language, a violation of Law 75 is a tort). When you add an arbitrator and not a court as the decision-maker on the question of what law applies, this adds another level of highly deferential scrutiny or finality to such determinations because the Federal Arbitration Act’s main policy is to enforce arbitration awards as written.
In Premium Tire v. Cooper Tire Company, AAA CASE No. 01-18-0002-4469, a single arbitrator in an arbitration supervised by the AAA in Ohio ruled that Law 75 applied to override an Ohio choice of law provision included within an arbitration provision in the dealer agreement because the termination claim alleged in the dealer’s counterclaim had a significant connection to Puerto Rico and Ohio choice of law rules required the application of Puerto Rico law to the arbitration proceedings as a matter of public policy. This is an example where state law directs the application of Law 75.But that may not be the case in other more business-friendly jurisdictions, like New York and Delaware, where freedom of contract overrides the public policy of other states or territories.
In the circumstances of the Ohio arbitration, a Puerto Rico court would probably also disregard the stateside choice of law provision, if it allows for termination of a dealer’s contract without just cause, because Law 75 expressly provides that such a waiver of Law 75 rights is illegal as a matter of public policy. Further, the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy does not compel an arbitrator to apply foreign law regardless of Law 75’s public policy. The FAA does not enlarge or subtract from the substantive rights of the parties, but enforces the agreement to arbitrate. The validity of contractual provisions is determined by state or Puerto Rico law, not the FAA. The FAA does not validate, without more, a choice of law provision included within an arbitration agreement simply because the FAA’s policy is to enforce the arbitration agreement as written.
Where the parties do not select Puerto Rico law expressly as the applicable law governing their agreements or choose to apply a state choice of law to a dealer’s contract that otherwise would be governed by Law 75, there is a potential for legal uncertainty and what substantive law governs can vary depending on the intricacies of different state laws.
Pick your state law wisely.
Tuesday, February 11, 2020
Mega-TV, a television producer in Florida and Puerto Rico, will soon broadcast a program "Profesionales de Primera" showcasing professionals in their fields (doctors, lawyers, and educators), describing their career trajectories. In my case, I tried to give a perspective about laws in Puerto Rico that protect entrepreneurs after they create a favorable market and clientele for the distribution of the products or services of manufacturers or suppliers.
The subject is relevant and important considering that the service and distribution industry in Puerto Rico accounts for roughly 20% of Puerto Rico's GDP. It cannot be ignored that, while federal grants or tax breaks to Puerto Rico have become politically unpalatable to some as means for our economic development, we have laws in our books that when used and properly applied can and should promote economic activity. In broad strokes, the upcoming interview will give me a chance to introduce representation statutes like Laws 75 and 21 in layman's terms to viewers in Florida and Puerto Rico as tools for entrepreneurs. I also provide practical tips to distributors and suppliers alike who have or are considering jump-starting distribution arrangements in Puerto Rico.
Excerpts of the interview in Spanish appear below:
Q. Existen leyes en PR que protegen a los empresarios en sus relaciones comerciales con los fabricantes?
Sí, la Ley 75 de 1964 protege a los distribuidores exclusivos y no-exclusivos y la Ley 21 de 1990 protege a los representantes de venta exclusivos.
Q. Porque estas leyes son importantes?
La industria de servicios y distribución aporta aproximadamente el 20% de la economía de Puerto Rico. Existen leyes en nuestros libros que estimulan el crecimiento empresarial y no dependen de la inyección de fondos federales o beneficios contributivos. Esencialmente, estas dos leyes están diseñadas para proteger al distribuidor y el representante de Puerto Rico, los cuales crean y desarrollan un mercado y clientela para los productos o servicios del principal, para que no le quiten o alteren sus derechos de representación sin justa causa o el pago de una justa compensación.
Q. Quienes están protegidos por estas leyes?
Por ejemplo, los distribuidores tradicionales que son intermediarios en la cadena de distribución entre el fabricante y la tienda en donde usted compra el producto.
Puede que también cualifiquen detallistas que venden directamente al consumidor. Aunque no lo crea, una tienda en un centro comercial que introduce o revende productos de una línea de un fabricante al consumidor, mantiene inventario, y hace promoción o mercadeo pudiera tener protección bajo la Ley 75.
Los representantes médicos que tienen exclusividad para representar productos por ventas a comisión a ciertos hospitales o proveedores médicos pudieran estar protegidos por la Ley 21.
Los franquiciados que operan franquicias pudieran estar protegidos por la Ley 75.
Q. Hay que hacer una inversión de dinero para tener la protección de estas leyes?
En las franquicias típicamente se requiere el pago de cuotas y regalías. Para un contrato de distribución, no es necesario pagar de antemano por los derechos de venta y distribución. Un distribuidor cualificado por lo general debe invertir en promoción y mercadeo para desarrollar la marca, pero no se requiere el pago de una cuota.
Q. Se necesita un acuerdo por escrito para estar protegido?
No es un requisito tener un acuerdo por escrito para cualificar como distribuidor o representante. Los acuerdos verbales son válidos y la ley cobija las relaciones establecidas cuando se compra, distribuye, y se revende la mercancía. Las relaciones comerciales pudieran estar protegidas sin la necesidad de un nombramiento verbal o por escrito.
Q. Se necesita tener exclusividad?
Para ser un distribuidor, no. La Ley 75 también protege a los distribuidores no exclusivos. Para ser un representante de ventas, sí. La Ley 21 requiere exclusividad sin definir que quiere decir.
Q. Que recomendaciones tiene usted para los distribuidores y representantes de ventas?
Puede que su negocio tenga una relación protegida por estas leyes y ni lo sepa. Si tiene un nombramiento de exclusividad o ha sido el único distribuidor o representante, es importante que lo documente por carta o contrato. La exclusividad es el activo más valioso de una empresa en la cadena de distribución.
Q. Que recomendaciones tiene para los fabricantes y manufactureros que quieren vender y distribuir productos en PR?
Asesórese. Ponga los acuerdos por escrito en un buen contrato. No se ponga a hacer negocios sin contrato.
Q. Cuales son los problemas que más usted ve en su práctica de leyes de distribución?
Hay muchos y diversos problemas, pero la mayoría son ocasionados por diferentes expectativas de negocios o problemas de comunicación entre los partes causados por la ausencia de contratos o contratos mal redactados.
Ejemplos de situaciones:
--Ventas en el territorio por otros distribuidores o ventas directas que interfieren con la exclusividad.
--Ventas por los clubes u otras tiendas nacionales, o ventas por el internet de productos que llegan a Puerto Rico.
--Cambios en los términos de pago o crédito.
--La imposición de cuotas o metas de compra o venta, sin ajustarse a las realidades del mercado de Puerto Rico.
Q. Cuáles son las consecuencias de violar estas leyes?
Pueden ser severas. Existe un remedio de interdicto provisional (“injunction”) para mantener la relación vigente mientras se dilucida el pleito. La compensación incluye la pérdida de beneficios y plusvalía, los costos del inventario y el valor de las inversiones en el negocio que no se pueden aprovechar por otras líneas. La medida de daños bajo la Ley 21 es un poco distinta ya que provee una compensación alterna basada en las ventas del representante. Sobre la Ley 75, esta dispone para el pago de honorarios de abogados y peritos si el distribuidor prevalece en el caso.
Wednesday, October 2, 2019
On May 9, 2019, this blog reported that a three-member panel of the AAA issued an award finding that Johnson & Johnson International terminated a non-exclusive distribution agreement without just cause in violation of Law 75 and awarded damages, fees, and interest to the dealer. Subsequently, the dealer moved in federal court to confirm the award under the FAA. The supplier moved to vacate the award under the Puerto Rico Arbitration Act (PRAA).
In Johnson & Johnson International v. Puerto Rico Hospital Supply, 2019 WL 4723892 (D.P.R. Sept. 25, 2019)(Besosa, J.), the court denied the motion to vacate and confirmed the award in its entirety. The court decided that the standards of review of arbitration awards under the FAA and the PRAA are different. Puerto Rico law permits review of arbitration awards under standards comparable to judicial review of determinations by administrative agencies and the FAA does not. The court held that the FAA governed here because the transactions at issue satisfied the "in commerce" requirement and a general Puerto Rico choice of law provision in the distribution agreement did not manifestly reflect an intent to have the PRAA govern judicial review of the award to the exclusion of the FAA. Applying the highly deferential standard in the FAA and the First Circuit's authoritative jurisprudence, the court held that "[t]he arbitration award sets forth a well-reasoned and methodical approach to the Law 75 dispute, citing the relevant statutes, case law, and evidence." The dealer stands to recover as a judgment almost $1.2 million in damages plus interest that continues to accrue until repayment.
Thursday, July 11, 2019
I came across an old case decided by Judge Jaime Pieras, Antilles Carpet, Inc. v. Milliken Design Center, 26 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348-349 (D.P.R. 1998), that discusses what evidence is relevant to goodwill damages in the context of a summary judgment motion, and there’s not much case law on this subject. This case involved a Law 75 dispute between a brand-name supplier of carpets and its Puerto Rico distributor. The parties disputed who terminated or impaired the relationship (the supplier denied a termination but the court found an issue of fact). The dispute also turned contentious on damages. The supplier urged that the distributor suffered no damages because it did not lose any revenues and clients from the termination. The court disagreed with the premise of the argument (though granted the MSJ on that ground because plaintiff failed to refute those allegations) since those are not the only two factors, citing a prior decision, to the effect that damages for lost profits are measured by Section 278(b).
On goodwill, the court found that the distributor’s deposition testimony (presumably not hearsay and otherwise admissible) created an issue of fact on whether reputational damage with clients suggests a possible loss of goodwill, which is an element of damages under Law 75. The witness said: “when you go to one of your major clients and say you no longer handle Milliken [the brand name], which is a major name in the carpet industry, it affects you image wise, and that's why I thought…”. The best evidence might have been testimony by the clients themselves but in this case was absent. The court granted and denied in part the MSJ but allowed the Law 75 claim to proceed on elements of damages other than lost revenues and clientele.
Wednesday, July 10, 2019
As I reported previously, a three-member panel of the International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association by majority decision (former U.S. District Court Judge José A. Fusté and Manuel San Juan, Esq.) issued a 63-page Award in favor of the distributor Puerto Rico Hospital Supply finding that Johnson & Johnson International violated Law 75 by terminating a non-exclusive distribution agreement without just cause and awarding damages, costs, and fees in excess of $1.1 million plus interest. The Panel dismissed J&JI’s counterclaim of $540,000 with prejudice. Panelist Edgardo Cartagena, Esq. dissented on the Law 75 award and concurred on the dismissal of the counterclaim.
Puerto Rico Hospital Supply filed a motion in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico in Civil No. 17-1405 (FAB) to confirm the Award as a judgment under the FAA and attached the Panel’s majority and dissenting decisions as exhibits.
Tuesday, July 9, 2019
Can a Puerto Rico corporation state a claim for Law 75 damages when it did not make a profit or loss on the sale of the relevant products, but a non-party related corporation did?
Heartland acquired the assets worldwide of the Splenda-branded sweetener from Johnson & Johnson in an asset purchase agreement (APA). Puerto Rico Supplies had been J&J’s distributor for Splenda and other consumer products in Puerto Rico. After the APA, Heartland considered various distribution alternatives and selected Plaza Provisions, its long-standing Puerto Rico distributor, for the new Splenda product line. After Puerto Rico Supplies wrote to Heartland claiming that it had become J&J’s successor and was bound to assume its prior relationship with J&J, Heartland filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court alleging, among other things, that it never conducted any business with Puerto Rico Supplies and it was not J&J’s successor under the APA. Puerto Rico Supplies counterclaimed for Law 75 termination damages and raised a bad faith claim under Article 1802 of the Civil Code. Puerto Rico Supplies decided not to sue J&J with whom it continued to have a business relationship for non-Splenda products. Heartland v. Puerto Rico Supplies Group, Inc., 2017 WL 432694 (D.P.R. 2017) (denying Heartland's motion to dismiss alleging that Johnson & Johnson was an indispensable party) provides an overview of the factual background prior to the summary judgment motion.
Discovery revealed that Puerto Rico Supplies, during the five-year period prior to the APA, had purchased Splenda and other products from J&J without a written agreement and transferred the Splenda inventory at cost to a non-party Premium Brands, Inc., an entity related to it by common ownership. It was Premium Brands the corporation that sold and distributed Splenda to customers in Puerto Rico and reported a gain or loss on those sales in its audited financial statements and tax returns. Both corporations operated for tax purposes as a pass through to reduce the tax liability of its owner. Mid-litigation, the two corporations merged and Puerto Rico Supplies became the sole surviving entity.
Heartland moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that the Law 75 claim had to be dismissed for lack of damages, an essential element of the claim. Heartland argued that First Circuit precedent in the Unilever case holds that the assets of separate corporations are distinct including the value of distribution contracts, and an affiliated corporation is not a party to an agreement under Law 75 simply because of its relationship to the signatory. Under this rationale, Puerto Rico Supplies, argued Heartland, suffered no damages under Law 75 because it transferred the Splenda inventory at cost and did not report a profit on any sales. Puerto Rico Supplies responded that for equitable reasons it should be allowed to reverse-pierce the veils of the corporations and treat both as one for Law 75 purposes. Puerto Rico Supplies also argued that both corporations functioned as a single entity with Premium Brands operating as a sales arm or division. Heartland countered that neither Puerto Rico nor Delaware law recognized standing to a corporate insider to reverse-pierce a corporate veil to state a claim to derive a financial or economic benefit and that the corporate separation of each had to be respected.
The issue was fully briefed on summary judgment but remained undecided by the pretrial conference.
The undersigned was lead counsel for Heartland in the case with CAB's Carla Loubriel and Diana Perez joining as attorneys of record.
The Franchising Forum of the American Bar Association released its new edition of the Franchise Desk Book, a two-volume compendium of franchising and relationship laws in selected states and Puerto Rico. This collection provides an overview of the legal requirements and standards in franchising and distribution laws and regulations in the United States and Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rico chapter has an overview of Law 75 and interpretive case law.
This author was a contributor to the Puerto Rico law chapter of this year’s edition of the Franchise Desk Book.
Enforcement of mandatory forum selection clause generates multiple/multi-state litigation and a mandamus petition in the First Circuit
Why do Puerto Rico distributors sign agreements with foreign or stateside forum selection and choice of law clauses when the performance of the agreement will be in Puerto Rico? What suppliers are after is obvious: to minimize the exposure to risk that comes from litigating Law 75 or Law 21 claims in Puerto Rico courts or the potential exposure to substantial economic damages. Of course, many distributors- often the principal players in the market- refuse to sign non-Puerto Rico forum or law provisions in distribution agreements routinely or as a policy or practice. What distributors want to avoid should be obvious too: prevent waivers of Law 75 rights.
Other distributors go ahead and sign those types of agreements often with little to no negotiation. Three reasons come to mind as to why they do and the first two are more probable than the third: 1) distributors lack commercial leverage and bargaining power or are not well informed and those clauses, which often include ADR provisions (arbitration and mediation), are deal breakers for the suppliers; 2) distributors, like other businesses, do a risk-reward analysis and knowingly and willingly assume the risk that comes with accepting those clauses as a condition to receive a new appointment leaving the fight to challenge those provisions in a Puerto Rico court for another day, or 3) the distributor is fraudulently induced to agree to ADR or forum selection provisions under false pretenses or with provisions that are hidden in fine print or reside in the internet for their click box acceptance. The third possibility presents one of the few and rare exceptions that may legally provide grounds to invalidate those types of clauses.
What should be clear is that once a distributor agrees to a written ADR or forum selection provision it is most probably stuck with it. Let’s be realistic, the chances are virtually nil that a federal court will invalidate a mandatory forum selection clause even in an agreement governed by Law 75. Chances in a Puerto Rico local court improve somewhat depending on the court or judge, but removal to federal court is likely to nip the local court’s intervention at its bud.
The case that I’m about to brief, Vitalife, Inc. v. Omniguide, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.P.R. 2018), is a run of the mill federal case validating a mandatory forum selection clause but with a twist of mandamus. There, a U.S. supplier of medical devices terminated unilaterally a distribution agreement with a Puerto Rico distributor. The Puerto Rico distributor threatened preliminary injunctive relief under Law 75, but the supplier quickly responded with a declaratory judgment action of its own in Massachusetts federal court. The agreement had both a mandatory forum selection clause and choice of law clause of Massachusetts. Not to be outdone, the distributor responded a day later with a suit in local Puerto Rico court for Law 75 termination damages and other remedies. The supplier removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds and moved to dismiss or transfer the case to enforce the forum selection clause.
Here comes the rub. The federal district court denied the supplier’s dispositive motion without prejudice. It’s not clear from the opinion why. Obviously, a denial without prejudice meant that, if the action in Puerto Rico moved forward, it would have mooted the forum selection clause. The order denying without prejudice a motion to dismiss on those grounds is not appealable. In a daring and bold move, the supplier filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the First Circuit. The First Circuit denied the writ without prejudice pending a determination on the merits of the motion to dismiss or transfer the case to Massachusetts federal court.
After settlement negotiations failed, the federal court (Besosa, J.) in a thoughtful opinion discussing the relevant Supreme Court cases, analyzed the standards to evaluate transfer motions when there is an enforceable agreement with a mandatory forum selection clause. The court found that the relevant analysis did not require an evaluation of the private interests at stake in considering whether or not to transfer the case. As the federal court in this district has uniformly held in other cases, the court determined that Law 75’s provision invalidating litigation outside Puerto Rico yields to precedent enforcing mandatory forum selection provisions. The court in a footnote made it clear that it was not passing judgment on the validity of the choice of law provision. With that, the court transferred the case putting an end to the Puerto Rico litigation. Cf. Aurora Casket Company v. Caribbean Funeral Supply Corp., 2017 WL 5633102 (D.P.R. 2017) (granting in part transfer motion and severed claims against parties not signatories to agreement with forum selection clause).
How likely or not is it that the Massachusetts federal court will apply Law 75 to the agreement or its termination? That was the risk that this distributor apparently willingly or knowingly assumed at its own peril when it signed the agreement.
Thursday, May 9, 2019
This is a follow up of the Law 75 case that I reported previously in this blog. See November 18, 2018. After entry of a default judgment on the counterclaim resulting from the distributor Skytec’s misconduct in discovery and the lifting of the distributor’s bankruptcy stay, the district court in Skytec, Inc. v. Logistic Systems, Inc., 2019 WL 1271459 (D.P.R. 2019)(BJM) held a post-default hearing to determine the award of damages due Logistic. Logistic, a Montana company, contracted to develop and implement various dispatch, geographic information, and records systems for public safety agencies in Puerto Rico, which were Skytec’s local clients. The court awarded Logistic $3.2 million in program installations, license fees, service charges and assessed pre-judgment interest at the rate of 6% under the Civil Code.
Logistic, the purported principal, moved for an award of expert witness and attorney’s fees under Law 75. In the absence of any objection, the court awarded recovery of expert witness fees of $32,847. The court did not address the legal issue, because it was waived, that Law 75 tracks the intent of Section 1988 of the federal Civil Rights Act, and under federal law, a prevailing defendant can recover fees only upon a showing of temerity or contumacy. Not unsurprisingly, Logistic grounded the request for attorney’s fees on temerity under Rule 44, Law 75, and the subcontract agreements which made an award of reasonable fees mandatory to the prevailing party in an action.
Interestingly, and citing Section 278e of Law 75, the court found that plain statutory language does not require an award of attorney’s fees to be reasonable (quaere, if or because the Civil Rights Act upon which Section 278e rests does). “In every action filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the court may allow the granting of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, as well as a reasonable reimbursement of the expert’s fees.” Logistic proposed its attorney’s fees be calculated using the lodestar method, which is the First Circuit’s “method of choice for calculating fee awards.” The court believed that the attorneys had failed to present itemized billing statements to enable the court to scrutinize the entries and the services performed.
As to fees, the court’s assessment was that “attorney’s fees awarded in the District of Puerto Rico indicates hourly rates hovering around $250 to $300 for experienced attorneys, $150 to $200 for associates, and $100 for law clerks and paralegals.” The court reduced Logistic’s local lead counsel’s hourly rate from $325 to $275 “in light of his [thirty-five] years of experience.” Other less experienced attorney’s hourly rates were reduced to $150-$130.
As to an out-of-state law firm of Logistic requesting fees, the court determined that “Puerto Rico must serve as the relevant community to determine fees, rather than the law firm or lawyers’ community in the United States, i.e. Seattle, because there are local lawyers more than able to handle the civil litigation at issue in this case.” The court reduced the hourly fees of the stateside attorneys from a top of $570 to $300 and associates from $260-$335 billed per hour to $150 and paralegals and contract attorneys to $75 an hour. Based on the record and without a finding of temerity, the court awarded Logistic $758,915 in fees and $101,047 in expenses.
AAA ICDR Panel rules that Johnson & Johnson International violated Law 75 and awards damages, fees, and costs to Puerto Rico distributor in excess of $1.1 million plus interest
The proceeding between Claimant Puerto Rico Hospital Supply Group, Inc. (“PRHS”) and Respondent Johnson & Johnson International (“J&JI”) Case No. 01-17-0007-4506 before a three-member panel of the International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association (referred to as the “AAA arbitration”) presented interesting and substantial questions under Puerto Rico Law 75, including:
«Is a termination actionable for damages when the manufacturer’s purported intention is to terminate all of the distribution agreements except one and its actions are consistent with a complete refusal to deal?
«Do preexisting financial motivations and economic interests of the manufacturer suggest that the business reason it ostensibly gives for a termination is a pretext?
«When is pretext sufficient to overcome the manufacturer’s proffer of just cause for termination?
«Must contractual payment terms that underlie the termination decision be reasonable and adjust to market conditions in the territory at relevant times?
«Does an offer of a payment and performance bond to secure the payment of a debt under the distribution agreement qualify as a payment in cash or its equivalent?
Claimant PRHS is one of Puerto Rico’s oldest and largest distributors of medical devices and products. For decades after 1964, PRHS sold and distributed Johnson & Johnson (and Ethicon) branded sutures and medical devices used in patient-critical surgical procedures by hospitals and other medical providers throughout Puerto Rico. There were various written distribution agreements in effect between the parties: most of the agreements were exclusive, but one was non-exclusive. The non-exclusive agreement had a mandatory arbitration provision while the exclusive agreements did not. J&J’s products represented approximately 20% of PRHS’s total sales, including roughly 5% for the non-exclusive product lines. There was a history of prior federal litigation between the parties that resulted, among other things, in agreeing to 90-day payment terms for all the contracts.
For the past 12 years, Puerto Rico’s economy has slumped leading up to the eventual public bankruptcy. Private and public hospitals have not been immune from this economic downturn and remain exposed to the mass migration of thousands of Puerto Rican residents (many are patients) to the mainland, the closing of beds and aisles in hospitals, and as if that were not enough, to catastrophic damages and business interruptions to the general population caused by Hurricanes Irma and María in 2017.
In 2015, the liquidity of hospitals grew tighter aggravating delays in payments to their suppliers, including to PRHS. While the days sales outstanding (DSO’s) of PRHS’s invoices to hospitals increased to roughly 183 days on average (some public hospitals took over 300 days to pay), PRHS’s distribution contracts with J&JI all had 90-day payment terms. During 2016, PRHS started falling behind in its payments to J&JI but continued making partial payments of millions of dollars.
J&JI decided to make a preemptive move to judicially enforce the 90-day payment terms. In March 2017, J&JI sued PRHS in federal court in Puerto Rico. J&JI requested a declaration that it had just cause under Law 75 to terminate all the agreements between the parties for non-payment of invoices and have PRHS cease and desist from using any of J&J’s brands and trademarks for the sale and distribution of its products. J&JI requested the collection of monies from PRHS exceeding $4.5 million allegedly due for products sold and delivered under all the agreements. What is more, J&JI filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief to attach PRHS’s bank accounts to secure the payment of the total alleged debt. PRHS opposed the request for equitable relief and moved to dismiss or stay the action in favor of arbitration. J&JI resisted arbitration.
The federal court denied J&JI’s request for equitable relief and granted in part PRHS’s motion to dismiss and stay the case in favor of arbitration concerning the non-exclusive contract. See Johnson & Johnson v. Puerto Rico Hospital Supply, 258 F. Supp. 3d 255 (D.P.R. 2017) (granting, in part, motion to dismiss) and 322 F.R.D. 439 (D.P.R. 2017) (denying J&JI’s motion for reconsideration). The court explained the stay reasoning essentially that an arbitration award could be dispositive of issues and claims in the federal action and there is a possibility of inconsistent determinations if the two proceedings could move forward simultaneously.
Meanwhile, J&JI sent a notice to PRHS in September 2017 unilaterally terminating all the exclusive agreements ostensibly for lack of payment but informing PRHS that it had decided not to terminate the non-exclusive agreement with the arbitration clause (as if that could have prevented PRHS from initiating the court-sanctioned arbitration). The termination of the exclusive contracts would become effective a day after Hurricane María made landfall over Puerto Rico. By the effective termination date, J&JI also took over the direct sale and distribution to customers of all the products previously sold and distributed by PRHS. In October 2017, J&JI informed PRHS that it was not, among other things, authorized to place any purchase orders for any products of J&J’s brands and demanded the return of all the inventory. In November 2017, PRHS complied and returned all its inventory of J&J’s products, including the products sold under the non-exclusive agreement, which J&JI later resold to customers.
PRHS filed a Demand for Arbitration at the AAA alleging a claim under Law 75 for termination without just cause of the non-exclusive agreement and requesting damages over $400,000 plus an award of fees and costs. PRHS also filed a separate action in federal court in Puerto Rico (Civ. No. 17-2281 (DRD)) under Law 75 for termination of the exclusive contracts allegedly worth over $10 million. The federal actions were not consolidated. J&JI responded in the AAA arbitration with a counterclaim for collection of monies which, as amended during the hearings, allegedly exceeded $540,000.
After extensive discovery, seven days of evidentiary hearings, and the lifting of an automatic stay resulting from the distributor’s intervening Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, on May 2, 2019, the AAA Panel rendered a final reasoned and written award. In a 63-page majority 2-1 decision (joined by Chair José A. Fusté and Manuel San Juan, Esq.) with one panelist concurring and dissenting in part (Edgardo Cartagena, Esq.), the Panel determined that J&JI had terminated the non-exclusive agreement and it had done so without just cause in violation of Law 75. The Panel awarded PRHS five years of lost profits on the line, the cost of the returned inventory, AAA fees, the pro rata share of fees it paid for panel compensation, attorney’s and expert witness fees as the prevailing party under Law 75, and costs and interest at the annual rate of 6.25% for a sum exceeding $1.1 million. The Panel credited fully the testimony on damages of PRHS’s expert Carlos Baralt, CPA. PRHS did not claim a loss of goodwill from the termination of the non-exclusive line. The Panel also unanimously concluded that J&JI had failed to prove the existence of the debt or its amount and dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice.
Whether or not there was just cause for termination was a fact-intensive question and the Panel heard live witness testimony and received in evidence documents relevant to this issue. Having its ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of just cause and needing to rebut a legal presumption of lack of just cause in P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, 278a-1(b)(1) from having sold the products previously handled by the distributor, J&JI argued that PRHS’s breaches of the 90-day payment term, without more, were just cause under Law 75.
First, there is no actionable termination claim under Law 75 unless the manufacturer terminates the contract, but detrimental acts that impair the contract are also actionable. Once the distributor proves a termination or impairment of the agreement, the burden shifts to the manufacturer to prove just cause. The Panel determined that, although the manufacturer may proclaim in writing not to have terminated the non-exclusive agreement, its subsequent actions and course of conduct proved its intent to refuse to deal and effectuate a termination of all the contracts. The Panel found sufficient evidence of a termination of all the contracts from conduct by J&JI prohibiting PRHS from honoring any purchase orders from its customers for the sale of any products of J&J’s brands, from prohibiting the use of any trademarks for marketing purposes, from ordering the return of all products on inventory, and later selling the inventory directly to the distributor’s former customers. The Panel held that J&JI’s “intention in 2017 was simply to terminate all commercial relations with PRHS and move from an indirect to a direct sales strategy, completely cutting out PRHS from the equation.” Award at 31.
Second, the Panel observed that, under Puerto Rico law, lack of timely or complete payments is not just cause without considering the terms of the agreement, whether the payment terms are essential obligations or not, how material are the breaches, and the conduct of the parties. The Panel gave weight to J&JI’s inconsistent conduct alleging the termination of the exclusive agreements but not the non-exclusive agreement when the basis of the distributor’s alleged breaches of contract was identical. The evidence established that the 90-day payment term in the non-exclusive agreement was not an essential obligation because the supplier alleged to have kept the non-exclusive contract in full force and effect despite the defaults in payment.
Regardless, the Panel found that J&JI’s reasons proffered for the termination were pretextual. Pretext can rebut a showing of just cause under Law 75. Before PRHS fell behind in its payments, J&JI’s internal marketing plans and strategies had devised a plan to implement a direct distribution model to bypass its Puerto Rico distributor. The Panel also gave weight to evidence derived from J&JI’s audited financial statements filed as public records proving that its Puerto Rico division had operational losses at relevant times after its parent company divested itself of another franchise causing the loss of millions of dollars in sales. The Panel had sufficient evidence from which to infer that J&JI had a motive to appropriate for itself the market and clientele created by PRHS which gave way to a convenient excuse to terminate the agreements for lack of payment.
It was also highly probative that J&JI’s manager in Puerto Rico took credit in her job evaluation for implementing, after PRHS’s termination, a “PRHS legal strategy” to move the organization from an indirect model to a direct model for the Ethicon franchise. “[The Panel] finds that the need to increase revenue, and not PRHS’s payment delays, was the driving force” behind J&JI’s move to conveniently cut PRHS out of the market. (Award at 39).
The Panel also decided novel issues of Puerto Rico law which should be relevant to any manufacturer or supplier considering the termination of a dealer’s contract for lack of payment in the context of adverse economic or market conditions. Section 278a-1(c) of Law 75 provides that any “rules of conduct” or distribution quotas or goals in a dealer’s contract must adjust to the realities of the Puerto Rico market at the relevant moment of the dealer’s non-performance, or else, are unenforceable.
From plain language, context, and statutory history, the Panel concluded that the prohibition in Section 278a-1(c) was not limited to performance standards set in a distribution contract, but also applied to payment terms. Because J&JI failed to present any evidence that the 90-day payment terms- as standards of conduct- adjusted to the realities of the relevant health care market in Puerto Rico during 2016-2017, the Panel credited the testimony of PRHS’s experts Julio Galíndez, CPA and Gustavo Vélez that the payment terms were unreasonable, and therefore, null and void under Law 75.
In the end, critical to the Panel’s analysis of just cause was sufficient evidence that, a few weeks before the termination notice, PRHS made an offer to J&JI to guarantee payment in full of the total amount of the debt outstanding on all the agreements by posting a payment and performance bond. An internal J&JI’s memorandum prepared contemporaneously with the offer corroborated this evidence. J&JI rejected the offer out of hand without any serious consideration or explanation to PRHS. The Panel found that the payment and performance bond would have operated like cash in hand to J&JI because under Puerto Rico law a surety steps in to pay the creditor for a default in payment by the debtor. The Panel concluded that a payment and performance bond would have obviated any need to terminate the distributor. Accordingly, the Panel held that the rejection of the bond proposal was “unreasonable and ill-considered” (Award at 46) and “adds to the Panel’s suspicions of pretextual motivations.” (Award at 49). The dissenting panelist was of the view that the termination notice, without more, proved no termination of the non-exclusive agreement but concurred with the majority’s dismissal of J&JI’s counterclaim.
On this record, the Award made the distributor whole for the full amount requested of compensatory damages for termination of the non-exclusive agreement, fees, interest, and costs, and the manufacturer took nothing on its counterclaim. The final award is subject to judicial enforcement.
The author is lead counsel for the Puerto Rico distributor in the arbitration and related federal litigation. Heriberto Burgos, Mariano Mier, and Mercedes Rodriguez are part of CAB's litigation team.
Sunday, December 2, 2018
Casellas Alcover & Burgos, P.S.C., one of Puerto Rico’s leading commercial litigation and alternative dispute resolution law firms, has a new face on the web. We are excited to announce the launch of our new website at www.cabprlaw.com
Our goal with this new designed website is to create a user-friendly browsing experience for our trusted clients, potential customers, and other visitors. As it concerns Puerto Rico’s relationship statutes, the news section of the site has links to articles on Puerto Rico Law 75, including a piece our Junior Partner Carla Loubriel and I wrote on Litigating Dealer Termination Cases in Puerto Rico published in the Franchise Law Journal of the American Bar Association, and a short piece I wrote on preliminary injunctions under Law 75 and federal rules preemption for the Puerto Rico Chapter of the Federal Bar Association.
We invite you to enjoy our website and let us know what you think.
Monday, November 19, 2018
In Ram-Rel, Inc. v. NCR International, Inc., 2018 WL 1941655 (TA Mar. 27, 2018), a panel of Puerto Rico’s appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, San Juan Part, in favor of a sales representative after holding a bench trial and finding liability and awarding damages under Law 21, the special statute protecting sales representatives (who do not qualify for protection as Law 75 dealers).
For over 37 years, Plaintiff had served as an agent in Puerto Rico for NCR’s hardware and software computer products. In 1993, Plaintiff signed a new distribution agreement under which NCR agreed not to appoint other distributors or resellers to market the product to certain customers under specified circumstances. A claim arose after NCR sold directly the products that Plaintiff had a right to sell exclusively. And, in 2008, NCR terminated the distribution agreement.
Plaintiff’s complaint in the local court pleaded only a claim of damages and breach of contract under Law 75. The Pretrial Conference Report did not raise a Law 21 claim. During trial, the court determined that Plaintiff did not qualify as a Law 75 dealer. Based on the evidence admitted at trial, however, the court held that Plaintiff qualified for protection as a Law 21 agent and awarded the alternative compensation under Article 5 consisting of 5% of the total sales generated by the agent during 8 years prior to termination, for a total compensation of $243,319 plus taxable costs.
NCR did not contest the liability determination of lack of just cause on appeal but only the award of damages. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and the court’s rationale is significant in various respects. First, the appellate court held that Rules 42.4 and 71 of the P.R. Rules of Civil Procedure permitted the trial court to award any remedy at law permitted by the admissible evidence, including Law 21 damages that were not pleaded or requested in the Complaint and the Pretrial Conference Report.
Second, the court held that expert testimony was not required to prove the amount of damages permitted by the alternative compensation formula in Article 5 because there was admissible evidence of the total sales generated by the sales representative prior to termination.
Third, the court held that the alternative compensation formula does not require discounting any costs incurred in generating the sales, so that the calculation is based on gross sales as established by the statute. The court explained that this alternative compensation is meant to simplify the process and facilitate the agent, who lacks the resources, to be able to prove its claim.
Fourth, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the claims made by Plaintiff’s shareholders in their individual capacities and against officers or employees of the Defendant. The court reasoned that Law 21, as a special law, did not codify a right of action by or against anyone other than a sales representative against its principal.
Finally, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to partially award taxable costs to Plaintiff as the prevailing party. Unlike Law 75 that has a special provision allowing attorney’s and expert witness fees to the dealer as prevailing party without a showing of temerity, Law 21 has no such provision, and there was no finding of temerity to award attorney’s fees against the principal in this case.
Sunday, November 18, 2018
In Skytec, Inc. v. Logistics Systems, Inc., 2018 WL 4372726 (D.P.R. September 12, 2018)(BJM), the dealer sued the principal for impairment under Law 75 and the principal counterclaimed both for breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The record supports multiple violations by the dealer of its discovery obligations to answer interrogatories and produce documents, including repeated missed deadlines by months and violations of court orders after warnings that failure to comply would result in severe sanctions.
The dealer's own doings fatally set it up for what was bound to happen: a dismissal of the Law 75 claims with prejudice and an entry of default on the counterclaim.
Mandatory forum selection clause in the Netherlands is held valid and enforceable to litigate Law 75 claims
In MD Distributors, Corp. v. Dutch Ophthalmic Research Center, 322 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D.P.R. 2018) (FAB), a Puerto Rico dealer sued a Dutch medical devices manufacturer in local court for termination of the dealer’s contract and damages under Law 75. The manufacturer removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) to enforce a forum selection clause providing for litigation in the Netherlands. After canvassing applicable federal jurisprudence and rejecting every conceivable argument that the dealer could make to escape litigation in the Netherlands, the court held that the dealer had failed to meet the “exceedingly high threshold” to invalidate the forum selection clause. Basically, the Netherlands provided an adequate forum to seek redress for the Law 75 claim. It was unlike Iran or South Korea that did not provide an adequate forum or did not recognize the validity of the claim.
The court also followed precedent in federal district court cases holding that the forum selection clause providing for litigation in a foreign country or in the States for that matter (with a connection to one of the parties or to the claims) was valid and enforceable despite Law 75’s express mandate for litigation in Puerto Rico. This aspect of the court’s ruling is more controversial as there is some authority in the Puerto Rico appellate courts invalidating a forum selection clause providing for litigation of Law 75 claims in a State (as there would be no FAA preemption issue concerning forum selection clauses within an arbitration agreement). This issue was not raised in this case and it may come up in a timely request for certification to PR’s Supreme Court.
Dealers beware! The forum selection clause in this case became part of an amended contract to the dealer's agreement. Seldom do dealers have a choice or leverage to negotiate amendments like this and face a difficult choice between a subtle or direct threat of termination or a refusal to deal if the amendment is not accepted. It should be clear by now that arbitration and forum selection clauses are amongst the few valid legal options available for manufacturers to minimize any Law 75 liability. But signing the agreement proves no solace to a dealer that eventually faces a termination and is forced to litigate its claims in a distant forum at a great cost and expense and before judges or arbitrators who have no clue about Law 75. Biting the bullet and refusing to accept a mandatory non-Puerto Rico litigation clause may be worth the business risk since that is the only real option to preserve litigation of a Law 75 claim in the local courts. This is particularly true when the manufacturer seeks to add the forum selection clause by an amendment to the established relationship. On the other hand, for the manufacturer, demanding arbitration and forum selection clauses as conditions to do business should be the standard protocol since the federal courts are more hospitable than ever to enforce the arbitration and forum selection provisions as written.
In Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. Premium Tire & Parts Corp., 2018 WL 3047747 (D.P.R. June 18, 2018) (DRD), the principal sued the dealer and the individual guarantors for breach of contract and collection of monies of $736,000. The dealer counterclaimed for impairment and de facto termination of the dealer’s contract for alleged price discrimination and other unfavorable business terms and for “insidious machinations” to void the personal guarantees.
A stumbling block for the dealer’s suit in federal court was that the contract had a broad and mandatory provision compelling arbitration for arising out of or related to claims and disputes. To no avail, the dealer argued that the arbitration agreement did not apply to post-termination claims and disputes and that Law 75 rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable.
After dissecting well-established precedent of the Supreme Court and the First Circuit, the court held that the Law 75 claims were arbitrable, the obligation to arbitrate survived termination of the dealer’s contract, and that the FAA preempted Law 75 to the extent that it nullified the arbitration agreement. Finding that it would avoid inconsistent determinations, the court stayed the claims pending arbitration against the guarantors as they were not bound by the arbitration agreement. See also Apindo Corporation v. Toschi Vignola, 2018 WL 718437 (D.P.R. January 31, 2018)(PAD)(enforcing arbitration agreement of Law 75 claim and also discussing issues of service of process and personal jurisdiction); Johnson & Johnson v. PRHS, 322 F.R.D. 439 (D.P.R. 2017)(denying principal's motion to reconsider order compelling arbitration and staying case).
What this case underscores is that, by now, a written arbitration agreement should be virtually fool-proof unless there is proof of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration agreement itself or the forum-selection provision is unreasonable as to make it unconscionable to arbitrate in a distant forum, usually in a foreign jurisdiction with little to no connection to the parties or the disputes. Even clauses compelling litigation or ADR in civilized or developed foreign countries are generally enforceable, unless the foreign state does not recognize the validity of the claim or does not provide adequate remedies (countries like Iran come to mind).
Saturday, May 19, 2018
It is no exaggeration that federal civil cases in the District of Puerto Rico have stalled on their tracks by motions to dismiss (“MTD’s”), especially Rule 12(b)(6) motions that have proliferated after Iqbal/Twombly (the Supreme Court’s plausibility standard).
Generally, because the Federal Civil Rules regulate when discovery can begin, the filing of an MTD will excuse a defendant from answering the complaint and will stay discovery. For some securities cases, federal substantive law stays all discovery pending a ruling on an MTD. With the existing Federal Rules in other non-securities civil cases, an MTD will de facto stay discovery unless the court enters an order setting a Rule 26(f) conference and the parties are bound to meet and confer to stipulate a joint discovery plan. With a pending MTD and no scheduling order in sight, all discovery will be stayed pending resolution of the MTD. So, if all that happens in the case is that the defendant files an MTD and the court does not decide the motion or enter a Rule 26 order pending a decision on the MTD, the case is stayed for how long it takes the court to decide the dispositive motion.
There is colloquially-speaking a "Cheo" rule (as in "estas en las paginas de Cheo" or like you are on a watch list) that requires district judges to report to the First Circuit all motions that remain undecided for three months or longer. Compliance with the Cheo rule varies depending on the judge or the case. In our district, with the clogged criminal docket and depending on the complexity of the case, we are talking about months if not years in some cases for the court to decide an MTD. If the MTD is denied, the defendant will have to answer the complaint, and this will trigger a scheduling order, the obligation to have the Rule 26(f) meeting, and finally, discovery can begin. By then, if a long time has passed without a ruling on the MTD, memories of witnesses will fade and proof may be lost (witnesses and parties include human beings who die). Delays take the wind out of the sails of dispute resolution. Parties also lose interest in prosecuting the cases. Lawyers are usually not working on those submitted cases. Nothing good comes from nothing happening in cases, for all those concerned.
You can argue one way or the other whether it is wise or even fair to stay discovery pending a ruling on an MTD. The argument is stronger for a stay when the MTD raises an objection to subject matter or personal jurisdiction because a case cannot move forward without jurisdiction over the complaint and the parties. It is another matter entirely when the MTD raises a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the legal sufficiency of the pleadings may depend on facts which have not yet been uncovered through discovery because the information is within the defendant’s possession or control or need to be explored or developed by full discovery. Iqbal/Twombly seem to have generated an increasing number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions challenging indiscriminately the sufficiency of the allegations in pleadings without the benefit of any discovery. As I reported in my previous blog, a few recent cases in both our district and the First Circuit are gaining traction in denying Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and postponing a decision on the legal sufficiency of plausible claims until a later stage (summary judgment, for example) after the benefit of discovery.
Perhaps one solution might be for the court to enter a standing order in civil cases that a defendant has to file an answer to the complaint and start discovery while an MTD based solely on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds remains submitted for decision. One way to accommodate competing concerns about wasteful and unnecessary litigation costs and fees if the MTD were to have merit would be to apply such a standing order in every civil case unless the defendant shows cause or proves prejudice from having to conduct discovery pending the MTD. This approach is consistent with long-established Supreme Court precedent in the "Landis" case requiring a showing of prejudice by a party moving to stay a federal case. This standing order approach would minimize incentives to abuse Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
In Vilá del Corral v. D’Accord, Inc., 2017 WL 1184002 (D.P.R. March 28, 2017) (“D’Accord”) (Domínguez, J.), plaintiff filed suit for collection of unpaid commissions and injunctive relief, invoking Puerto Rico’s Sales Representative Act No. 21 (a special law modeled after Law 75). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant breached an exclusive agreement existing, for over “twenty-nine years”, that authorized him to represent D’Accord branded menswear clothing in Puerto Rico. Defendant attacked the sufficiency of the allegations under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., arguing that “there are no contract documents” to support Plaintiff’s argument that he was an exclusive sales agent for D’Accord in Puerto Rico. Id. at *2.
The court noted that it was “unclear [from the Complaint’s allegations] whether the agreement was written or oral and whether it was later novated.” Id. at *4 n. 2. What is more, the court was “skeptical” on whether Law 21, enacted in 1990, applied retroactively to the alleged business relationship predating the enactment of Law 21, but lacked the “requisite clarity to reach a properly-founded conclusion” at the pleadings stage without the contract documents. Id. at *4 n. 3. Considering the well-established plausibility standard governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court denied the motion to dismiss holding that “Plaintiff has made a satisfactory showing of a plausible Act 21 claim, which the Court deems sufficient to level up and proceed to discovery.” Id. at *4 (quoting) Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., 952 F. Supp. 75 (D.P.R. 1997) (Providing that determinations of whether a person is a dealer or exclusive sales representative is fact-intensive and should not be made on the pleadings).
The takeaway of the D’Accord decision is that, no matter how dubious a claim might seem on the pleadings without the benefit of full discovery, a plaintiff is not required to plead the particulars of a binding contract or establish an extinctive novation to state a plausible claim under Law 21 (or for that matter, Law 75) and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. This holding is aligned with recent First Circuit authority. APB Realty, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, No. 17-1906 slip op. at 9 (May 7, 2018) (vacating Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of breach of contract claim because “the complaint alleges facts from which the court can plausibly infer the making and breaking of a contract”). D’Accord applies correctly the plausibility standard governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss an action brought under any one of Puerto Rico’s representation statutes (Law 75 or Law 21).